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Abstract
We study the problem of optimal contract design in an environment with an
uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed experts. We characterize
optimal contracts and observe that consulting two experts rather than one is always
benecial; this is so even if the bias of a second expert is arbitrary large and this
expert would have no value in a cheap talk environment. We also provide conditions
under which these contracts implement the rst best outcome; our sucient con-
dition is weaker than the conditions in the literature on the environments without
commitment. In order to derive optimal contracts, we prove a \constant-threat"
result that states that one can restrict attention to contracts in which the action
implemented in case of a disagreement among the experts is independent of their
reports. A particular implication of this result is that an optimal contract is con-
stant for a large set of experts' preferences and hence is robust to mistakes in their
specication.
We thank Christian Hellwig, Daniel Kr ahmer, Vijay Krishna, Stephan Lauermann, Ming Li, and
Larry Samuelson for helpful comments.
y Department of Economics, Penn State University, Kern Building, University Park, PA 16801. Email:
mylovanov@ gmail.com
z Economic Theory II, University of Bonn, Lenn estrasse 37, 53113 Bonn, Germany.
E-mail: zapechelnyuk@ hcm.uni-bonn.de1 Introduction
A growing body of literature studies optimal contracting between a decision maker and
a single biased expert who has decision relevant information.1 This paper focuses on
environments in which the decision maker can obtain a second opinion from another
expert. We are interested in the following questions: What is the value of a second
opinion and what is the structure of optimal contracts?
We consider a model with an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed
experts. The set of actions available to the decision maker is a unit interval. The experts
are strategic and biased in dierent directions.2 The experts' information is not veriable,
i.e., communication is cheap talk. The decision maker can commit to an action rule that
is contingent on the reports of the experts. (This commitment assumption distinguishes
our model from the literature on cheap talk communication.)3
Our rst result is that adding a second expert is always valuable for the decision
maker: In our model, the optimal contract improves the payo of the decision maker
relative to what she would obtain with one expert (Proposition 3). This holds regardless
of the magnitude of the biases of the experts. Hence, there is a clear sense in which two
experts are complementary.4 In particular, this observation is true even if the biases of
the experts are suciently large and the experts are not valuable without commitment,
i.e., no information can be obtained from the experts through cheap-talk communication.5
1Holmstr om (1977, 1984), Melumad and Shibano (1991), Martimort and Semenov (2006), Alonso and
Matouschek (2008), Goltsman et al. (2009), Kovac and Mylovanov (2009), Armstrong and Vickers (2008),
Koessler and Martimort (2009), Li and Li (2009), and Lim (2009) study optimal contracts in environments
in which contingent monetary transfers are not feasible. In Baron (2000), Krishna and Morgan (2008),
Bester and Kr ahmer (2008), Raith (2008), and Ambrus and Egorov (2009), the optimal contracts are
characterized for environments in which the decision maker can commit to monetary payments that are
contingent on the expert's recommendation.
2We discuss the case of similarly biased experts in Section 5.
3Crawford and Sobel (1982) is the seminal reference on cheap talk communication with one ex-
pert. Cheap talk communication with two experts has been studied in Krishna and Morgan (2001a,b),
Battaglini (2002, 2004), Ambrus and Takahashi (2008); Ambrus and Lu (2009), and Li (2008, 2009)
4Krishna and Morgan (2001b) consider sequential cheap talk communication with two experts and
show that there is a value to a second expert; however, this is so only if at least one of the experts
has a relatively small bias. In a model with two experts, discrete outcome, action spaces, Li (2008)
demonstrates that the value of the second expert may be negative.
5It is well known from Battaglini (2002) and Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) that full revelation of
experts information can be achieved if the biases of the experts are not too large relative to the outcome
1Similarly to the cheap talk models, existence of a second expert allows the decision
maker to implement the rst best outcome in some environments. We provide conditions
(Proposition 2 and Remark 1) for the rst best to be implementable; the conditions
bound the size of bias of each expert. These conditions are related but weaker than those
required to implement the rst best outcome in cheap talk environments (Krishna and
Morgan (2001a), Battaglini (2002), and Ambrus and Takahashi (2008)).
Our characterization of optimal contracts relies on the \constant-threat" result (Propo-
sition 1) that states that we can restrict attention to constructions in which any disagree-
ment between experts results in a lottery that is independent of their reports. This result
signicantly simplies the design problem, and we view it as the main technical contribu-
tion of the paper. The commitment assumption in our model is essential for this result. By
contrast, the constructions of, e.g., rst best outcomes in cheap talk environments might
have to implement actions after a disagreement between experts that depend non-trivially
on their reports.
A particular implication of the constant-threat result is that an optimal mechanism
might be constant across a large set of environments that dier in preferences of the
experts and the distribution of private information (Corollary 1). This observation is
valuable if the decision maker is concerned about robustness of the optimal mechanism
with respect to these details of the environment.
In this paper, we assume that both experts are perfectly informed. This assumption is
common in the related literature. Yet, it is an important assumption in that it allows the
decision maker to check the reports of the experts against each other, and inconsistent
reports do not occur on the equilibrium path. The question of robustness to noise has been
addressed in Battaglini (2004) within a model with multiple experts, a multidimensional
environment, and noisy signals. In particular, the paper shows that if the decision maker
has some commitment power, it becomes possible to achieve the rst best outcome in the
limit as the number of experts increases. We discuss robustness of our results to noise in
Section 5.
The problem of optimal contracting with two experts has also been studied in Marti-
mort and Semenov (2008). Our models and approaches are quite dierent. Martimort and
Semenov (2008) consider two experts who hold dierent independently distributed pri-
vate information and, unlike in our paper, are biased, at least in expectation, in the same
space. By contrast, in the model we study no information transmission is possible through cheap talk if
the biases of the experts are suciently large.
2direction. Furthermore, their paper employs dominant strategy implementation whereas
our solution concept is Nash equilibrium. Among their results, Martimort and Semenov
(2008) demonstrate impossibility of the rst best outcome and show that a suciently
high bias renders the experts not valuable for the decision maker.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The
constant-threat principle is derived in Section 3. Applying this principle, we characterize
the optimal contracts in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss the robustness of the contracts
with respect to noise and describe the optimal contract for the environment with similarly
biased experts.
2 The Model
There are two experts i = 1;2 and a decision maker. The decision maker has to select an
action from set X = [0;1] of feasible actions. The most preferred action for the decision
maker (the state), x 2 X, is a realized value of a random variable ~ x with support on
X. The decision maker is uninformed about x and believes that the distribution of ~ x is
represented by a cumulative distribution function F.
The experts know the value of x. The decision maker can ask them for recommenda-
tions and commit to take an action that is contingent on their reports.
Let y denote an action. The payo function of the decision maker is u0(x;y) and the
payo functions of expert i = 1;2 is ui(x;y). We assume that for every x 2 X each
function ui(x;y), i = 0;1;2, is strictly concave in y.
The decision maker's payo function is maximized at the action equal to the state,
argmax
y2X
u0(x;y) = x; x 2 X:
For every x 2 X we dene y
i(x) = argmaxy2X ui(x;y), i = 1;2. We assume that the
experts have opposing interests:
y

1(x) < x < y

2(x); for every x 2 X: (1)
Some of our results are obtained for the environment with quadratic preferences and xed
biases, which is standard in the literature on experts: u0(x;y) =  (x   y)2, u1(x;y) =
 ((x   b1)   y)2 and u2(x;y) =  ((x + b2)   y)2, where b1;b2 > 0.
Let X denote the set of distributions on X (randomized actions). Identifying point




ui(x;y)(dy); x 2 X;  2 X:
A contract is a measurable function
 : X
2 ! X; (x1;x2) 7! (x1;x2);
where (x1;x2) is a randomized action that is contingent on the experts' reports (x1;x2).
A contract induces a game (a direct mechanism), in which after observing x the experts
simultaneously make reports x1;x2 2 X and the outcome (x1;x2) is implemented.
A contract  is incentive compatible if truth-telling, x1 = x2 = x, is a Nash equilibrium:






By the revelation principle, any equilibrium outcome of the experts' interaction in a
game whose space of outcomes is X or X can be represented by the truth-telling equilib-
rium outcome in some incentive compatible contract. In what follows, we will consider
only incentive compatible contracts.






among all incentive compatible contracts. Since the set of incentive compatible contracts
is compact in weak topology and v is continuous in , an optimal contract exists.
3 The Constant-threat Principle
In any contract, the main incentive issue is to motivate each expert to agree with the
other expert who is expected to tell the truth. Therefore, the contract must punish
disagreements. The diculty here is that (i) a priori it is unclear which expert, if any,
tells the truth, and (ii) since the experts have opposing interests, a punishment that is
more severe for one of the experts tends to benet the other expert. As a result, a threat
lottery that results after a disagreement may depend non-trivially on the experts' reports.
We now prove our main technical result, the constant-threat principle, which allows us
to characterize optimal contracts. It states that one can restrict attention to contracts in
4which the lottery implemented after a disagreement has support on extreme actions 0 and
1 and is independent of the reports. This result reduces the problem of nding optimal
contracts to the problem of nding actions that are implemented if the experts report
their information truthfully, (x;x), and the probability of implementing y = 1 after a
disagreement. Thus, it drastically decreases complexity of the design problem because
we avoid the optimization problem in which we search on a continuum of lotteries with
support on X that are implemented after a disagreement (one threat lottery for each pair
of reports x1;x2 2 X;x1 6= x2).
The idea behind the constant threat principle is as follows. First, by concavity of the
experts' payo functions, any lottery over actions implemented after a disagreement can
be replaced, using a mean-preserving spread, by a lottery between actions 0 and 1 without
aecting the experts' incentives to report truth.
Now, let  be a contract in which a disagreement always results in a lottery between
0 and 1. The crucial step in the the proof is to observe that, say, expert 1 (who is left-
biased) always prefers action x to the extreme right action 1. Hence, in all states where
a disagreement lottery is better than x, his payo from action 0 must be strictly greater
than that from x. It follows that in these states his expected payo from that lottery
must be decreasing in the probability assigned on action 1 (similarly, the payo of expert
2 from a disagreement lottery must be increasing in the probability assigned on action
1). Let r be the lottery that achieves the highest payo for expert 1 among the lotteries
that can be achieved by the best deviations of expert 1 in various states x 2 X. Denote
by p the probability this lottery assigns to action 1. Dene p for expert 2 analogously.
The result now follows from the observation that p  p, which is nothing else than the
argument that minimax is larger than or equal to maximin. Hence, there exists a lottery
rc that assigns probability pc to action 1, where p  pc  p, such that replacing every
threat lottery with rc does not violate the incentive constraints of the experts.
Let X  be the set of probability distributions with support on f0;1g. We say that a
contract  = (;z1;z2) is constant-threat if
(C) there exists c 2 X  such that (x1;x2) = c whenever x1 6= x2.
We say that two incentive compatible contracts,  and 0, are equivalent if they imple-
ment the same action whenever the reports of the experts coincide, i.e., (x;x) = 0(x;x)
for all x 2 X. Thus, two equivalent contracts implement identical actions in equilibrium,
but may implement dierent actions o-equilibrium.
5Proposition 1 (Constant-threat principle) For every optimal contract there exists
an equivalent constant-threat contract.
Note that a constant-threat contract which is equivalent to some optimal contract
must be optimal as well, since it implements the same actions in equilibrium.
Proof. Let  be an optimal contract. Observe that by concavity of ui(x;y) in y, i = 1;2,












ui(x;1); x 2 X:
Hence, replacing (x1;x2), x1 6= x2, by a lottery that puts probability
R
y(x1;x2)(dy)
on action 0 and the complementary probability on action 1 will not violate the incentive
constraints of the experts. Therefore, there exists an equivalent contract 0 in which every
threat lottery implemented after a disagreement has support on f0;1g.
We now show that there exists a constant threat contract c equivalent to 0. For
every pair of dierent reports, x1;x2 2 X;x1 6= x2, let p(x1;x2) be the probability that
(x1;x2) in 0 assigns to 1 after a disagreement. We extend the denition of p(;) to X2
by setting p(x;x) = 1  
R
y(x;x)(dy) for all x 2 X. Dene
P1(x) = fp(x
0;x)jx




Di(x;p) = maxf0;pui(x;1) + (1   p)ui(x;0)   ui(x;(x;x))g; p;x 2 X;i = 1;2:
By construction, a deviation by expert i in state x leading to a lottery p0 2 X is non-
protable i Di(x;p0) = 0. Furthermore, by denition of p(x;x),
Di(x;p(x;x)) = 0; x 2 X;i = 1;2:
Thus, incentive constraints (2) can be written as
Di(x;p) = 0; x 2 X; p 2 Pi(x); i = 1;2: (IC)
We now show that
D1(x;p) is non-increasing in p for every x 2 X;
D2(x;p) is non-decreasing in p for every x 2 X:
(*)
6We start by showing that we can restrict attention to contracts that on the equilibrium
path are deterministic and implement actions that are bounded by the experts' most
preferred actions,
(x;x) 2 [0;1]; y

1(x)  (x;x)  y

2(x); x 2 X: (P3)
To see why this is true, x some x0 2 X and suppose rst that (x0;x0) is a proper lottery.
Then, concavity of the payo functions implies that replacing (x0;x0) with the expected
value of this lottery improves the payos of all players without violating any incentive
constraints. Next, let (x0;x0) = y0 2 X;y0 > y
2(x0) for some x0 2 X. Since y
2(x0) is
closer than y0 to the most preferred alternatives of all players, concavity of the payo
functions implies that setting (x0;x0) = y
2(x0) improves the payos of all parties on the
equilibrium path without violating incentive constraints.
Since u1(x;y) is concave in y and y
1(x)  (x;x) by (P3), it follows that u1(x;y) is
decreasing in y on [(x;x);1] for every x, and hence
u1(x;(x;x))  u1(x;1):
If, in addition, u1(x;(x;x))  u1(x;0), then, D1(x;p) = 0 for every p 2 [0;1]. On the
other hand, if u1(x;(x;x)) < u1(x;0), then u1(x;1) < u1(x;0) and, hence u1(x;p) and
D1(x;p) are decreasing in p. This establishes the rst statement in (*). The argument
for the second statement is analogous.
Next, let
a1(x) = inf P1(x); x 2 X;
a2(x) = supP2(x); x 2 X:
By (IC) and continuity of ui, we have Di(x;ai(x)) = 0 for x 2 X. By (*),
D1(x;p) = 0; p  a1(x); x 2 X;























7Then, there exists pc such that p  pc  p. By (3),
Di(x;p
c) = 0; x 2 X;i = 1;2:
The result now follows from (IC).
The result in Proposition 1 can be generalized. We say that an incentive compatible
contract is undominated if there does not exist another incentive compatible contract that
yields to all players a greater (equilibrium) payo in every state and a strictly greater
payo in some state. The arguments behind Proposition 1 are not aected if we consider
undominated contracts instead of optimal contracts.
In the remainder of the paper, we will study optimal contracts in the set of con-
stant threat contracts. Typically, however, there exist contracts that induce the same
equilibrium outcome and are not constant threat.
Finally, we would like to remark on the multiplicity of equilibria in the constant
threat contracts. In this paper, we focus on the truthtelling equilibria; this is justied by
the revelation principle. At the same time, there can be many other equilibria in a given
contract. For example, consider a constant threat contract in which a disagreement results
in a lottery that mixes between 0 and 1 with equal probability and which implements
y = 1=2 if both experts report x0. For this contract, it is an equilibrium for the experts
to report x1 = x2 = x0 regardless of the state.
4 Optimal Contracts
Let C be the set of incentive compatible constant-threat contracts. By Proposition 1,
there exists an optimal contract in C. In this section, we characterize these contracts.
4.1 First Best Contracts
We start our analysis of optimal contracts by identifying conditions under which they
implement the most preferred alternative of the decision maker. A contract in C that in
each state implements the most preferred action for the decision maker, if it exists, is
called rst best.
We assume that each expert's utility depend only on the dierence between her most
preferred action and the implemented action: for each i = 1;2
ui(x;y) =  di(y   (x   bi(x))); (4)
8where bi : X 7! R, b2(x) < 0 < b1(x) for all x 2 X, and di : R 7! R is a convex
dierentiable function that achieves its minimum at 0, i = 1;2. The point x   bi(x) is
the most preferred action of i in state x. The values of b1 and b2 reect the conict of
preferences between the experts and the decision maker and are called the experts' biases.
The next result provides a sucient condition for existences of the rst best contract
under these assumptions.
Proposition 2 Let (4) hold. There exists the rst best contract if sup
x2X;i=1;2
jbi(x)j  1=2.
Proof. There exists the rst best contract if and only if there is p 2 [0;1] such that for
each expert i = 1;2 and for every x 2 X,
ui(x;x)  (1   p)ui(x;0) + pui(x;1): (5)











1   x + bi(x)
2

= di(1=2)  di(bi(x)); (6)
where the second inequality follows from the assumption that sup
x2X;i=1;2
jbi(x)j  1=2. Ob-
serve that (6) is equivalent to (5) with p = 1=2, which implies existence of the rst best
contract with the treat lottery that puts equal probabilities on 0 and 1.
The rst best contract constructed in the proof of Proposition 2 uses as a threat point
the lottery that mixes with equal probability between 0 and 1. The logic behind the
construction is straightforward: if the experts' biases are not too large, they are better
o under the decision maker's most preferred alternative rather than the threat lottery.
It is interesting to note that the optimal threat lottery is symmetric even if the experts'
biases are not equal and their payo functions are not symmetric.
Under some additional structure on the payo functions, the sucient condition in
Proposition 2 becomes necessary.
Remark 1 Assume that di is symmetric around 0 and that bi(x) = ~ bi is constant, i = 1;2.
Then, there does not exist the rst best contract whenever maxj~ bij > 1=2.
Proof. Assume that ~ b1 > 1=2. First, let p < 1. Then,
(1   p)d1(1  ~ b1) + pd1(~ b1) < (1   p)d1(~ b1) + pd1(~ b1) = d1(~ b1);
9which contradicts (5) for x = 1 and i = 1. On the other hand, if p = 1, then for
x = maxf1 +~ b2;0g,
d2(1   (x  ~ b2)) < d2(~ b2);
which contradicts (5) for i = 2. The argument for ~ b2 <  1=2 is symmetric.
The above results are related to Krishna and Morgan (2001a), Battaglini (2002), and
Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) who study cheap talk communication with two experts. For
the environment considered in Remark 1, Proposition 1 in Battaglini (2002) establishes
that a necessary and sucient condition for a fully revealing cheap talk equilibrium is
that the sum of the absolute values of the experts' biases is less than half of the measure
of the action space.6 Proposition 2 and Remark 1 complement this result by providing
necessary and sucient conditions for the rst best outcome under commitment. Our
condition is weaker and it bounds the size of each expert's bias rather than their sum;
interestingly, the value of the bound is the same in both environments.
The construction of fully revealing equilibria in cheap talk and our construction of a
rst best contract are analogous but not identical. In a cheap talk environment, for any
pair of disagreeing reports there is a threat action such that an expert who can induce
this pair of reports prefers the rst best outcome to the threat action. This threat action
is supported by (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs that make it optimal. The proof then veries
that for each pair of states (reports) there exists a threat action that satises a number of
inequalities that depend on biases of the experts; in equilibrium, the threat action might
have to depend non-trivially on the reports of the experts.
By contrast, in our model a contract can use lotteries as threat actions that cannot be
supported in a cheap talk model, even out of equilibrium.7 The proof of the possibility
of the rst best in our environment employs a constant threat lottery that mixes equally
between the extreme actions and makes use of concavity property of payo functions.
Furthermore, the proof of the necessary condition relies on the fact that it is sucient to
consider report-independent threat lotteries.
6Krishna and Morgan (2001a) provide a sucient condition for a fully revealing cheap talk equilibria
in an environment with constant and equal opposing biases that each expert's bias is less than 1/4.
7The concavity of payo functions implies that a lottery cannot be a best response for the decision
maker.
104.2 Robustness of the First Best Contract
An interesting implication of the above results is that the lottery that mixes between 0
and 1 with equal probability is the most eective threat lottery for implementing the rst
best if the payo functions are symmetric and the biases are not too large. This is so
even if the experts' biases are not symmetric.
Corollary 1 Let the conditions in Proposition 2 be satised. Then, the rst best contract
is constant in the preferences of the experts.
The constancy of the optimal contract is a useful feature if the decision maker is con-
cerned about robustness of the contract with respect to her knowledge of the environment.
In particular, if the optimal contract is constant, then the decision maker need not possess
correct knowledge about the magnitude and the direction of the experts' biases, or the
distribution of their information.
4.3 Second Best Contracts
What are the properties of an optimal contract if the rst best outcome cannot be imple-
mented? In what follows, we characterize optimal contracts that, given the threat lottery,
maximize the payo of the decision maker in each state.8
Observe that any contract in C can be identied by a pair
(p;g) : p 2 [0;1]; g : X ! X;
where p is the probability of action 1 after a disagreement and g(x) is the action imple-
mented on the equilibrium path.
Let us pick a constant-threat contract (p;g) in C. By concavity of payo functions,
both experts prefer y = x in state x = p to the treat lottery,
ui(p;p)  pui(p;1) + (1   p)ui(p;0):
This implies that an optimal contract implements the most preferred alternative for the
decision maker, g(x) = x, at least in state x = p. In addition, if the experts' payo
functions are strictly concave, we obtain g(x) = x for a proper interval containing p.
8Trivially, there also exists a continuum of other contracts that deliver the same expected payo for
the decision maker but do not have this property for a set of states of measure zero.
11Proposition 3 An optimal contract implements the most preferred alternative of the de-
cision maker in a non-empty set of states. If the experts' payos are strictly concave, this
set is not a singleton.
This observation highlights the value of two experts for the decision maker. Two
experts are always valuable because there exists a contract which implements the most
preferred action of the decision maker at least in some states. This is true regardless of
the degree of conict of preferences between the experts and the decision maker.
We now describe the structure of an optimal contract in states where the rst best
outcome is not incentive compatible. For a given probability p of action 1 in an optimal
constant-threat contract, let ~ X
p
i be the set of states in which expert i weakly prefers the
threat lottery to the decision maker's most preferred action,
~ X
p
i = fx 2 [0;1] : ui(x;x) <  ui(x;p)g;
where  ui(x;p) is expert i's expected payo from the threat lottery p,
 ui(x;p) = (1   p)ui(x;0) + pui(x;1):
Hence, ~ X
p
1 [ ~ X
p
2 is the set of states where implementing the most preferred action is not
incentive compatible.
We now show that at any state x in ~ X
p
1 [ ~ X
p
2 the incentive constraint of only one of
the experts is violated, i.e., ~ X
p
1 \ ~ X
p
2 = ?. By assumption, the experts have opposing
interests, i.e., y
1(x) < x < y
2(x). If p > x, then expert 1 prefers action x to action y = p
and hence to the threat lottery. Otherwise, expert 2 prefers x to the threat lottery. Hence,
at least one expert prefers x to the threat lottery, implying that ~ X
p
1 \ ~ X
p
2 = ?.
It follows immediately that whenever x 2 ~ X
p
i for some expert i, an optimal contract
will stipulate to choose action g(x) that is the \closest" point to x (from the perspective




4.4 Quadratic preferences and constant biases
We can obtain stronger results if we impose additional structure on the preferences of the
experts. Specically, we make the assumption, which is standard in the literature, that
12the expert's preferences can be represented by a quadratic payo function with a constant
bias,
ui(x;y) =  (y   (x   bi))
2; i = 1;2; (7)
where b1 > 0 and b2 < 0. Assume also u0(x;y) =  (y   x)2.
In order to determine the set ~ X
p
i of states where expert i prefers threat lottery p to the
most preferred action x for the decision maker, we solve the inequality ui(x;x) <  ui(x;p).
Using (7) we obtain
(1   p)(x   bi)




In order to state the result, the following denitions are in order. For any p 2 X, let
Di = b2
i   p(1   p) and let
x
p




i = p   bi +
p
Di: (9)



























i)\[0;1]. Note that ~ X
p
1 is nonempty if and only if b1 > 1=2 or p > p; symmetrically,
~ X
p
2 is nonempty if and only if b2 <  1=2 or p < p.
The next result describes the structure of an optimal contract.
Proposition 4 Let (p;g) be an optimal constant-threat contract. Then,
g(x) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
x + jb1j  
p
  u1(x;p); if x 2 ~ X
p
1;
x   jb2j +
p




Proof. If x 62 ~ X
p
1 [ ~ X
p
2, then the rst best action is incentive compatible, g(x) = x.
Let x 2 ~ X
p
1 (the argument for x 2 ~ X
p
2 will be analogous). In an optimal contract the
decision maker implements an action g(x) that minimizes the distance to x, subject to






(y   (x + b1))
2  (1   p)(x + b1)
2 + p(1   (x + b1))
2:








Figure 1: An Optimal Contract with Quadratic Preferences, jb1j = jb2j = 1, p = 1=2.
Solving the above inequality for y we obtain
y 2 [0;1]n

x + b1  
p





Since x 2 ~ X
p
1, the above constraint must be binding. As b1 > 0 by assumption, the closest
action to x is g(x) = x+b1  
p
  u1(x;p). It is straightforward to verify that in this case
g(x) 2 ~ X
p
1. As ~ X
p
1 \ ~ X
p
2 = ?, the incentive constraint for expert 2 is satised as well.
In the case where both biases are greater than 1=2, an optimal contract looks as follows













2], both experts prefer the decision maker's most preferred action to the threat
lottery, and the rst best outcome is achieved (the points along the 45 line on Fig. 1).
For the \extreme left" states in [0;x
p
1), expert 2 strictly prefers the threat lottery to x, and
hence the decision maker implements an action that is closer to expert 2's most preferred
action. The distortion for the \extreme right" states is analogous.
The result in Proposition 4 allows us to transfer the problem of nding an optimal







14where gp, with some abuse of notation, is given by Proposition 4.
The value of the threat point in the optimal contract depends on the distribution
of the state x. In general, there is no closed form solution for optimal threat points.
Nevertheless, under additional assumptions, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 Let the experts' biases be opposing and equal, b1 =  b2 = b, and distribu-
tion of x be symmetric, i.e., F(1 x) = 1 F(x), x 2 [0;1]. Then there exists an optimal
contract with p = 1=2.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.
5 Discussion
5.1 Similarly biased experts
Throughout the paper we have considered the environment in which the experts are biased
in dierent directions (c.f., (1)). Let us now assume that the experts are biased in the
same direction, e.g., they always prefer an action higher than the decision maker's optimal
action. Then, the experts have the same least preferred action y = 0, which is the optimal
threat. Therefore, the contract that threatens the experts to implement y = 0 whenever
they disagree can implement the rst best outcome.
5.2 Optimal contracts with one expert
In this subsection, we comment on the dierence between optimal contracts in our model
and in a model with one expert only. Without a second expert, the recommendations to
the decision maker by the rst expert remain unchecked. Therefore, the relevant incentive
constraints are with respect to other actions that can be induced by the expert's reports
rather than with respect to the outcome resulting from a disagreement with another ex-
pert. Consequently, optimal contracts have a number of dierences: There is bunching
of implemented actions across states with one agent (Proposition 3 in Alonso and Ma-
touschek (2008), and Proposition 1 in Kovac and Mylovanov (2009)) and no bunching
with two experts (Proposition 4). With one agent, optimal contracts do not implement
rst best actions because this cannot be made incentive compatible (see, e.g., Proposition
1 in Kovac and Mylovanov (2009)). This is not so with two experts: there is always a
15nonempty subset of states where the rst best outcome is implemented (Propositions 2{3
in this paper). Furthermore, in the model with one expert the optimal contract imple-
ments the expert's most preferred action for a positive measure of states (Proposition 3
in Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and Proposition 1 in Kovac and Mylovanov (2009)).
Again, this is not so with two experts (Propositions 2 and 4).
5.3 Discontinuity and robustness to noise
In this paper, we assume that both experts are perfectly informed. This assumption
is common in the literature that studies cheap talk communication with two experts in
payo environments similar to the one in this paper. It has been made, for example, in
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989), Krishna and Morgan (2001a,b), Battaglini (2002), Levy and
Razin (2007), Ambrus and Takahashi (2008), and Li (2008, 2009).9 Yet, this assumption
is important. It allows the decision maker to check the reports of the experts against each
other, and inconsistent reports do not occur on the equilibrium path. The issue of robust-
ness to noise was pointed out by Battaglini (2002, 2004) in the context of fully revealing
equilibria in cheap talk that rely on implausible out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Although there
is no issue of out-of-equilibrium beliefs in our model due to commitment assumption, the
contracts identied in this paper are discontinuous in the reports. As a result, one might
wonder if they are not robust with respect to, for example, small amount of exogenous
noise added either to signals or to reports (as in Blume et al. (2007)), or minor mistakes
of the experts.
Ambrus and Lu (2009) discuss our construction of rst best contracts and demonstrate
its robustness to a specic type of noise used in Battaglini (2002) and studied in their
paper. In this section, we take a dierent approach and show that a constant threat
contract can be modied and made continuous in the experts' reports. In the environments
with a small amount of noise, the modied contract achieves payos close to the payos in
the original contract in the environment without noise. The modied contract is incentive
compatible in the original environment but may not be so in noisy environments. This
approach to robustness is analogous to the approach taken in Ambrus and Takahashi
(2008) for a multidimensional cheap talk environment. One interpretation of this approach
9The experts are imperfectly informed in the models of Austen-Smith (1993), Wolinsky (2002), and
Battaglini (2004). See also Li and Suen (2009) for a survey of work on decision making in committees;
this literature often assumes that dierent members of the committee hold distinct pieces of information.
16is that the experts (incorrectly) believe that they make no mistakes and their reports are
not distorted during transmission to the decision maker.
Assume that ui is twice continuously dierentiable and strictly concave in the imple-
mented action, i = 1;2. Fix a small constant " > 0. Consider the set of constant threat
contracts C" where the incentive constraints are satised as strict inequalities with the
margin at least ", i.e., (p;g) 2 C" if
ui(x;g(x))   ui(x;p) + "; for all x 2 [0;1]; i = 1;2 (11)
We will refer to a constant threat contract that maximizes the expected payo of the
decision maker subject to (11) as an "-optimal contract.
Let (p;g) be an "-optimal contract. Denote by L the bound on dui(x;g(xi))=dxi,








For any two reports x1;x2 2 X, we dene 0(x1;x2) to be the lottery that chooses the
threat lottery (that assigns probability p on decision 1) with probability (x1;x2) and
action g((x1 + x2)=2) with the complementary probability. That is, the probability that
the threat lottery is chosen is a linearly increasing function of the distance between the
reports, x1 and x2.
Thus constructed, the contract 0 is continuous in the experts' reports. Furthermore,
if both experts report their information truthfully, the decision maker's payo in 0 for a
small amount of noise is close to the decision maker's payo in (p;g) in the environment
without noise.
We now show that 0 is incentive compatible in the environment without noise; fur-
thermore, the incentive constraints are satised with strict inequality. By construction,





ui(x;g(xi)); if x1 = x2;
 ui(x;p); if x1 6= x2:
It follows then that i's payo in 0 is equal to
v
0









1(x;x1)   u1(x;p)   u1(x;g(x))   " < 0:
Next, let L
"jx   x1j < 1. Then (x1;x) = L
"jx   x1j, and we obtain
v
0
1(x;x1) = (1   (x1;x))u1(x;g((x1 + x)=2)) + (x1;x) u1(x;p)   u1(x;g(x))
 (1   (x1;x))[u1(x;g((x1 + x)=2))   u1(x;g(x))]   (x1;x)"
< ju1(x;g((x1 + x)=2))   u1(x;g(x))j   Ljx   x1j
 Ljx   x1j   Ljx   x1j = 0;
where the rst inequality is obtained by (11) and the last inequality is obtained by applying
the Taylor expansion to u1(x;g((x1 + x)=2)) with respect to x1 and that the derivative
du1(x;g((x1 + x)=2))=dx1 is bounded by L.
The argument for i = 2 is analogous.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we study optimal contract design in an environment with an uninformed
decision maker and two perfectly informed experts. Our main insight that allows charac-
terizing optimal contracts is the \constant-threat" result that states that one can restrict
attention to contracts in which the action implemented in case of a disagreement among
the experts is independent of their reports. This result simplies the design problem and
makes it possible to characterize optimal contracts. We describe optimal contracts and
provide conditions under which these contracts implement the rst best outcome. Finally,
we remark that, unlike in the models with cheap talk communication, there is a comple-
mentarity among experts for the decision maker, that is, adding a second expert is always
valuable.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5. For b  1=2 the statement holds trivially, since the rst-best
contract can be constructed (see Proposition 2 and its proof).
Assume b > 1=2. Let (p;gp) be a constant threat contract, where gp is described in
Proposition 4. By an argument presented in Section 4.4, if both biases are greater than



































Recall that ui(x;p) =  (1   p)(x   bi)2   p(1   (x   bi))2 and, by (9), x
p




1   p(1   p) and x
p
2 = p   b2  
p
b2
2   p(1   p). Using the symmetry assumption
b1 =  b2 = b, we obtain that x
p
2 = 1   x
1 p

















 u1(1   x;1   p))
2dF(x):
Next, using the assumption F(x) = 1   F(1   x) that entails dF(x) = dF(1   x), after




















Let us now dierentiate v(p;gp) with respect to p. Observe that  u1( x
p













=  (b   b)
2 = 0:
Note that d x
p








is well dened and equal to zero. An analogous statement holds for  x1(1   p). Thus,
derivatives w.r.t. bounds of integration are ignored, and after dening h(x) =
@u1(x;p)
@p =




























It is straightforward to check that @
@pv(p;g)jp= 1
2 = 0. We now verify that v(p;gp) is concave
in p, thus p = 1=2 is a maximum. By b > 1=2, we have h(x) =
@u1(x;p)
@p = 2(x+b) 1 > 0.







19is nondecreasing in p. Furthermore, since b p
 u1(x
p
1;p) = 1, the above expression is non-
negative for all x  x
p
1. Thus, the right-hand side term in (12) is nonincreasing in p. A
similar argument shows that the term in (13) is nonincreasing in p as well. It follows that
v(p;gp) is concave in p.
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